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Abstract
Nowadays, phishing attacks are on the rise and more sophisticated than ever since they are
incredibly profitable for cybercriminals. These attacks consist of social engineering techniques
via digital channels such as web, email, social media, mobile applications and any other form of
digital communication. One of the main reasons people become victims of phishing is because
they are not able to detect fake from legitimate sites.
To solve this problem, the outcome of this thesis is a gamified web application to educate
people around the world to identify phishing sites. Similarly, to create awareness of this topic and
use it at international events, sponsored by Avast, or other external channels like blogs and social
media.
After releasing the game application to the public, we found that only about 60-70 % of users
tested could identify the scam sites correctly. Although this number seems positive, it is scarily
low based on the fact that we showed only one type of phishing (i.e. scam websites). We estimate
that running a test, on a similar user sample, but with other types of phishing leads to a meaningful
impact on negative results.
From a security perspective, this study emphasizes the need to aid in protecting potential
victims against phishing, and the significance of this project for the upcoming years.
Keywords: phishing game, cybersecurity, gamified web application, social engineering
Supervisor: Richard Barry, Ph.D.
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Abstrakt
V dnešní dobeˇ jsou útoky phishingu na vzestupu a sofistikovaneˇjší než kdy prˇedtím, protože
jsou pro pocˇítacˇové zlocˇince neuveˇrˇitelneˇ výhodné. Tyto útoky spocˇívají v technikách sociálního
inženýrství prostrˇednictvím digitálních kanálu˚, jako je web, e-mail, sociální média, mobilní
aplikace a jakákoli jiná forma digitální komunikace. Jedním z hlavních du˚vodu˚, procˇ se lidé
stávají obeˇt’mi phishingu, je skutecˇnost, že nejsou schopni odhalit skutecˇné z falešných stránek.
Abychom tento problém vyrˇešili, je výsledkem této práce gamifikovaná webová aplikace,
která vzdeˇlává lidi po celém sveˇteˇ k identifikaci phishingových webu˚. Stejneˇ tak je trˇeba zvýšit
poveˇdomí o tomto tématu a použít jej na mezinárodních akcích sponzorovaných spolecˇností Avast
nebo na jiných externích kanálech, jako jsou blogy a sociální média.
Po vydání herní aplikace pro verˇejnost jsme zjistili, že pouze asi 60-70 % testovaných uživatelu˚
dokázalo správneˇ identifikovat podvodné weby. Prˇestože se toto cˇíslo jeví jako pozitivní, je deˇsivé
nízké na základeˇ skutecˇnosti, že jsme projevili pouze jeden typ phishingu (tj. Podvodné weby).
Odhadujeme, že provedení testu na podobném vzorku uživatelu˚, ale s jinými typy phishingu, by
meˇl významný dopad na negativní výsledky.
Z hlediska bezpecˇnosti tato studie zdu˚raznˇuje potrˇebu pomoci prˇi ochraneˇ potenciálních obeˇtí
prˇed phishingem a význam tohoto projektu pro nadcházející roky.
Klícˇová slova: phishingová hra, kybernetická bezpecˇnost, gamifikovaná webová aplikace,
sociální inženýrství
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Avast Software s.r.o. is a global company dedicated to providing safety and privacy
for everyone and their famous antivirus protects millions of users against the most
dangerous threats online (e.g. Spyware, Malware, Ransomware, Phishing). Technol-
ogy is rapidly evolving, and cyber crimes are not the exception, every day people
around the world become victims of cyber-attacks.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis addresses the problem of phishing, where the attacker tricks the user into
revealing his personal information (i.e. passwords, bank account numbers, credits
cards) [1]. To achieve this, criminals use social engineering techniques by appealing
to people’s vanity, greed, curiosity, altruism, or respect for or fear of authority to get
them to reveal this type of sensitive information or access to an IT system [2].
According to independent research, phishing attacks targeting American institu-
tions grew by 40% in 2018, and 80% of them targeted some of the leading industries
(e.g. Financial, Email, Cloud, Payment services and SaaS). In 2018, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that companies all around the world lost
$12.0 billion because of compromised business email accounts [3].
Most of these attacks happen through email or fake websites but also include
telephone or smishing (i.e. SMS phishing). Phishing is still the leading attack
1
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method by cybercriminals because of its impact and scale. The main reason people
are not able to detect real from phishing sites is that they look and feel like exact
copies of legitimate websites.
The devastating consequences of successful phishing attacks on companies could
include loss of customers due to data breach and brand trust, as well as in many cases
bankruptcy to smaller and mid-sized businesses as everyone is a target, regardless of
their size. Hence, it is crucial to create awareness about the topic and educate people
about how to identify and avoid phishing sites.
1.2 Strategy
In order to solve this problem, we needed to develop a strategy that ensures success
and fulfilment of our primary goal. The goal of this project is to educate and engage
people on the topic of phishing. The way to achieve this is to base our research and
final output on the following eight dimensions of quality:.1. Performance: In section 2.3, we defined requirements and characteristics of
the application..2. Features: In section 3.2, we describe the qualities that enhance the main
functionalities of the application — moreover, the inclusion of other features to
improve the overall performance, as explained in section 3.3..3. Reliability: From the analysis in chapter 2, it is undeniable the rise of phishing
attacks. Hence, the reliability of the application for the upcoming years..4. Conformance: Documentation for the code is included for further development
and to meet the production standards..5. Durability: Since phishing trends are continually changing it is crucial to
update the content and maintain the application regularly to keep relevancy and
functionality..6. Serviceability: In order to guarantee the service of the application and avoid
breakdowns during events, it is necessary to do user testing beforehand..7. Aesthetics: For this project, we work together with UX and UI specialist
to assure the aesthetics of the application. Design patterns were taken into
consideration to respect the brand identity.
2
................................1.3. Structure of the Thesis
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we analyze further the problem to solve with real examples that
demonstrate the impact of phishing on the last years and its behaviour. Moreover,
define the goals for the project and the assigned solution and requirements.
In Chapter 3, we describe the development process from the early stages to the
actual deployment. Similarly, present some of the critical factors used to successfully
built the application. Finally, identifying issues of the current implementation and
how they were solved.
In Chapter 4, we demonstrate some use cases and the data obtained to support
our research during the analysis. The results show the importance to emphasize this
topic and create awareness.
In Chapter 5, we conclude the thesis and outline future work on this project.
3
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Chapter 2
Analysis
The Avast Threat Lab team is continuously working on the detection and eradication
of different types of cyber-attacks. Recently, their researchers helped the interna-
tional police to neutralize 850,000 attacks of a malware known as Retadup, which
distributed a malicious cryptocurrency miner and other malware to infected devices
[4]. The previous case is just an example of all the threats happening every day
around the world, being phishing one of the most popular ones due to its profitability.
Phishing attempts grew by 65% in 2017 [5], and nearly 1.5 million sites of
this type created every month [6]. The average phishing attack costs a mid-sized
company $1.6 million [5]. Most of these attacks occur by spam emails, which
represents 54% of all emails sent globally [7]. Moreover, in 2017, an average user
was receiving up to 16 malicious spam emails per month [8].
There are different types of phishing:
. Phishing scams: Target personal identity and financial information.. IT/SaaS phishing: Targets access to organizations credentials and data.. SMS phishing: Target mobile phones using text messages to obtain personal
information.. Voice phishing: Target landline telephone systems to gain access to private
personal and financial information.
In 2018, email statistics from Office 365 reported to block 5 billion phish emails
5
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and identify 8 million business compromise attempts. The same report mentioned
that 20% of users click on malicious links after 5 minutes [9]. Phishing emails are
usually less successful thanks to the advances on classifying them as spam, but some
of them manage to slip into inboxes.
Organizations in the United States remain the most popular for phishers in 2018,
accounting 84% of total phishing volume. Concerning increment on phishing volume,
Canada is one of the most outstanding with an increase of 173% (i.e. 4% of total
volume). Turkey had a shocking increment of 905% but still represents only 1% of
the total worldwide [3].
Often, phishing sites try to look legitimate by using HTTPS. For most of the
users when a browser shows HTTPS abbreviation and a green padlock symbol, it
represents that a site is secured. A survey, conducted by the Anti-Phishing Working
Group (APWG), show that 80% of respondents believe the green padlock symbol
indicates that a site is legit and safe [10], which is not the case.The APWG second-
quarter report of 2019 [11] showed that at least 50% of phishing sites were using
SSL.
Figure 2.1: APWG graph showing phish attacks hosted on HTTPS.
Another problem is the use of free hosting providers, which has been increasing
tremendously and represents 13% of phishing volume. Criminals use this hosting
type because it allows them to create a large volume of sites for no cost in a short
time. One of the most popular providers of this kind is 000webhostapp, accounting
69% of free hosted phish sites [3]. Other examples are outdated WordPress sites
that can be easily hacked and use to run phishing campaigns. Generally, the price to
deploy a phishing kit is roughly $26 [12].
6
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Moreover, cybercriminals use social engineering techniques to trick people into
giving up personal information and login credentials. Despite phishing there are
other types of social engineering [13], some examples are the following:
. Baiting: Offer something desirable as a way to download a malicious file.. Pretexting: Pretend to be someone else to get access to privileged data.. Scareware: Trick someone into thinking their computer is infected and offer a
"solution" that contains a virus.
A real example of this is the US Department of Justice’s 2016 data breach [14],
where 200GB of data was exposed. The hacker used social engineering to imper-
sonate a member of the staff and convince others to provide access to internal files.
Another case is the 2016 US elections scandal with Cambridge Analytica [15],
where personal data was used to influence public opinion. These cases demonstrate
how much phishing can scale and therefore, the importance to create consciousness
and educate users to prevent these attacks.
For this project, we collaborated with malware specialists from the Avast Threat
Lab team to acquire the data set needed to build the application. This chapter will
describe the project life cycle to achieve the desired outcome. Finally, the assigned
solution will be defined together with the functional and non-functional requirements
for this project.
2.1 Project Life Cycle
Previously, Martin Hron [16] (Malware Researcher at Avast) created the same
application. However, the implementation was not suitable for its use and required
some improvement. Therefore, some goals had to be set to ensure the successful
development of the new version. These goals are as follows:.1. Determine a strategy for game functionality and effectiveness during the project
briefing stage..2. Communicate and establish a relationship with malware analysts from the Avast
Threat Lab team, and to collaborate on acquiring the correct data sets needed to
develop the application.
7
2. Analysis........................................3. Work together with UX/UI specialists and visual designers, to ensure that both
the visual and functional requirements are aligned and possible..4. Set up a server accessible publicly that could showcase the application and
handle the data without any direct connection to a live database for security
purposes..5. Develop the application using web technologies such as HTML, CSS, JavaScript
and NodeJS..6. Do user testing and make improvements before the actual events.
2.2 Assigned Solution
This section will describe in detail the requested solution, which is the primary
output of this thesis. A gamified web application must be implemented to showcase
data provided by the Avast Threat Lab team. The main objective is to educate and
engage consumers on the topic and give a positive brand impression of Avast. The
requirements, functional and non-functional, will be described in the upcoming
section.
2.3 Functional Requirements
The elementary functionalities that the outcome of this project must accomplish are:
F1 Display a set of data containing images and URLs hosted on the Avast CDN.
F2 Provide an option to select the correct answer (i.e. real or fake site).
F3 Generate a score based on the given answers.
F4 Screen size responsiveness.
F5 Keep track of game results.
8
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2.4 Non-functional Requirements
The way how these functionalities will work is:
NF1 Limited to 5 images per game. The data must be presented uniquely and
randomly (i.e. different set of content on each try).
NF2 Answers interpreted by buttons.
NF3 Correct answers will get 100 points or zero otherwise.
NF4 Adjust website elements based on the screen size (i.e. desktop, tablet or mobile).
NF5 Keep track of game results without using a database (e.g. Google Analytics).
9
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Chapter 3
Application development
This chapter will cover in detail all the development process. Starting with the User
Experience (UX) and User Interface (UI) design, which were crucial to ensure the
proper functionality of the game. Then, describe how the application was built and
set up for deployment. Finally, analyze the given feedback and discuss possible
improvements in the current implementation.
3.1 UX and UI Design
Based on the functionalities defined in the requirements, we needed to create wire-
frames to map the content and interaction of the application. This wireframe allowed
to see each stage of the game and determine the behaviour of every component.
Desktop and mobile versions consist of the next screens and elements:.1. Introduction. Header. Brief introduction. Actions: Start.2. Game Play. Indicator of the game position. URL + Image
11
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. Current Score. Actions: Fake, Real and Reset. States: Correct or Incorrect.3. Summary. Overall score. Evaluation according to score. Actions: Download and Reset. States: Perfect, Ok or Disaster
Figure 3.1: Game flow and screens.
Figure 3.2: Introduction screen for mobile.
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Figure 3.3: Game screen for desktop.
After each stage of the application was defined, the next step was to develop the
UI design. This design had to respect different brand elements such as typography
and palette. Similarly, it had to be intuitive for users and illustrate a playful mood to
make the topic more interesting and entertaining.
Figure 3.4: Introduction screen.
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Figure 3.5: Game play screen.
Figure 3.6: Dialogue screen.
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Figure 3.7: Summary screen.
Figure 3.8: Tips screen.
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3.2 Build and Deployment
The outcome of this thesis is visible on https://phish.avast.com. The site
was implemented using web technologies such as HTML, CSS, JS and NodeJS. The
upcoming sections will describe other parts of the implementation which led to the
final output.
3.2.1 Data Source
The source data provided by the Avast Threat Lab team consisted of a set of pairs,
accessible on a TSV file, with the following format: the image of a real or fake
website and the URL. However, we had to add one parameter, which is the type
of site. The reason for this is because most of the phishing attacks try to replicate
well-known websites (e.g. Amazon, Facebook, PayPal). Therefore, the source data
contained multiple images of the same legitimate site.
This way, it was simpler to check each record type and store it in an array. If the
next record would have the same type, it would be skipped. This option is optimal,
considering that our final set of images is limited to five. If the collection of images
would higher, then this implementation would not be efficient due to the high cost of
searching. Other data structure could be used instead (e.g. Binary Search Tree).
1 "015b6cc46e11bec4176cb20429be0b43" #Fake image
2 "489e387b47fcee4bcf9f506dac6edb52" #Real image
3 "https://www.paypal-transfertcompte.com/b/" #Fake URL
4 "https://www.paypal.com/us/signin" #Real URL
5 "paypal" #Type
Code listing 3.1: TSV file containing source data.
The previous solution partially solves the problem of repeated images but does
not provide any criteria to generate random content. The result set of items should
not have only real or fake sites. For this reason, the status parameter is present at the
end of each record. This status consists of a random integer between 0 and 1, which
represents the real or the fake content of that particular record
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1 let con = [
2 ’015b6cc46e11bec4176cb20429be0b43’,
3 ’489e387b47fcee4bcf9f506dac6edb52’,
4 ’https://www.paypal-transfertcompte.com/b/’,
5 ’https://www.paypal.com/us/signin’,
6 ’paypal’,
7 ’1’ ];
8 let items = []; /*Max. 5 items*/
9 items.push(con);
Code listing 3.2: Array of items.
This format also allowed to index and retrieve the data instantly to the HTML file.
1 readTsv(function (data) {
2 data.forEach((item) => {
3 params.items.push({
4 ’img’: ’/data/images/’ + item[item[5]] + ’.jpg’,
5 ’status’: item[5],
6 ’url’: item[item[5] + 2]
7 })
8 })
9 });
Code listing 3.3: Read TSV function in Node JS file.
1 <% items.forEach( item => { %>
2 <div class="mySlides">
3 <span class="img-src" data-status="<%=item.status%>" >
4 <img alt="source-img" src="<%=item.img%>">
5 </span>
6 </div>
7 <% }) %>
Code listing 3.4: HTML code calling the read function.
3.2.2 Image Detection
Avast takes into account different factors to recognize phishing sites. Despite the
popularity of the domain, suspicious URL or website certificate sometimes is needed
to go deeper to determine the legitimacy of a website. Therefore, the Avast Threat
Lab team also uses AI together with computer vision methods to analyze images of
doubtful sites even further.
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Their algorithm uses these methods to choose particular pixels and their surround-
ings and compare them against potential targets (i.e. images of legitimate sites).
Usually, an image containing pixels that are similar to another does not guarantee it
belongs to the target set. Hence, spatial verification techniques are used to compare
the relation of particular pixels in a picture.
Figure 3.9: Example of accepted and rejected spatial configuration of pixels.
Thanks to Tomáš Trnka (Avast Threat Lab researcher), we could simulate this
algorithm. His implementation used OpenCV, an open-source computer vision
library, to demonstrate in a more graphical way how the spatial verification works.
The way the program works is by taking a source (i.e. potential image of a fake
website) and a target (i.e. the image of a legitimate website) as input and comparing
them. The result is the source image highlighted with the differences against the
target.
Figure 3.10: Example of Amazon output and target image.
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This tool allowed to spot some other elements to look out for in suspicious sites,
not just the URL, such as missing logos, misleading messages or unusual input fields
and buttons. In order to preserve the aesthetics of the application, a different design
was used to highlight the differences.
Figure 3.11: Highlight of phishing images.
3.2.3 GA Tracking
For this project, it was not possible to use a database to store game results. Mainly
because it would require some testing beforehand, due to security reasons, and
postpone the development of the application. However, it is essential to keep track of
these results for future research on the topic and make improvements. The solution
was to use Google Analytics [17] (GA) and Google Tag Manager [18] (GTM).
At the end of each game, there is a summary page where users can see their
results. There are three types of states based on the score: Perfect, Ok and Disaster.
Using GTM is possible to define tags to label events which are called by triggers
and send data to GA. Therefore, each state of the game was label as a Results event
and triggered by data layer from the JavaScript code.
1 dataLayer.push({’event’: ’Results’, ’status’: ’Perfect’});
2 dataLayer.push({’event’: ’Results’, ’status’: ’Ok’});
3 dataLayer.push({’event’: ’Results’, ’status’: ’Disaster’});
Code listing 3.5: Game events triggered by data layer.
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Furthermore, events can also be trigger by HTML elements such as IDs, classes or
links. One example of this is the download button, which is triggered by a parameter
on the link called data-role that is used on other Avast websites to track this type of
events.
1 <a id="download" class="bi-download-link"
2 href="https://www.avast.com/"
3 data-role="download-link">
4 </a>
Code listing 3.6: Event triggered by data role.
Figure 3.12: Events listed on GA.
3.2.4 Responsiveness
Screen size responsiveness is a must for every website these days. The short time for
development did not allow to create a proper mobile design for the game. Therefore,
existing elements of the website were modified and adjusted, using CSS media
queries, to provide a better mobile experience.
1 @media (max-device-width : 425px)
2 and (min-device-height : 575px)
3 and (orientation : portrait) {
4 body {
5 padding-top : 15%;
6 }
7 }
Code listing 3.7: CSS media queries for mobile version.
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Figure 3.13: Tablet size view of the game.
Figure 3.14: Mobile size view of the game.
3.2.5 Server Setup
The last step for deployment was to set up a server where to host the application.
The server had to allow to install Node JS packages, install SSL certificates and have
accessibility from the client-side. Considering other Avast application are being
hosted on the same server, some of the minimum hardware requirements are the
following:
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. 16GB RAM. CPU 2 cores. SSD 128GB
3.3 Testing and Feedback
The first user test, described in section 4.1, was crucial to identify potential issues
on the performance of the game. Thanks to these findings, other improvements
could be made on time for future events and also were of great value for the overall
development. The upcoming sections will describe the main problems in the current
implementation and how they were solved.
3.3.1 Issues of the Current Implementation
The main problem with the first version of the game was page loading and response
time to user input. It would at least 5 seconds for the website to load and had a slow
response on specific elements (e.g. buttons, dialogues). To find the cause of this
performance, we used an open-source tool called Lighthouse [19] to run an audit on
the website. The results showed a low score for performance.
Figure 3.15: Google Audit before improvements.
A significant part of the issue came from the JS code, specifically the use of HTML
DOM innerHTML [20] property. Generally, compared to other DOM manipulation
methods (e.g. JQuery), innerHTML is most of the times faster to replace HTML
code [21]. However, it is not the best practice to use it for raw text since it represents
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a security vulnerability. One example of this is the dialogues on the game, which is
a generic container that changes continuously by the use of this property.
1 function isPhishing(answer) {
2 let dialogueImg = document.getElementById(’dialogue-img’);
3 let dialogueAns = document.getElementById(’dialogue-ans’);
4 if (answer) {
5 dialogueImg.innerHTML =
6 ’<img alt="correct" src="img/icons/correct.png">’;
7 dialogueAns.innerHTML =
8 ’<h2>Good job!</h2>’;
9 }
10 }
Code listing 3.8: Example of innerHTML in JS file.
Inserting HTML image tags to the container represented a slowdown on the overall
performance.
Figure 3.16: Example of delay generated by innerHTML.
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3.3.2 Improvements
Since icons could easily replace all these image tags, we decided to use an icon toolkit
based on CSS called Font Awesome [22]. All images inside this container were
replaced by icons to keep consistency on the design and avoid user misunderstanding.
1 function isPhishing(answer) {
2 let correct = ’<i class=\’fas fa-thumbs-up\’
3 style="color: #160E53;
4 font-size: 8em;"></i>’;
5 if (answer) { dialogueImg.innerHTML = correct; }
6 }
Code listing 3.9: Example of innerHTML using icons.
Similarly, removing unnecessary innerHTML calls from the JS code. This property
parses content as HTML, including spaces, formatting and line breaks. Moreover,
if the node includes special characters (e.g. & or <) these are returned as HTML
entities (i.e. “&amp;” or “&lt;”). In cases where only raw text needs to be replaced
there exist other methods that provide faster performance and do not parse any
HTML code (e.g. textContent).
1 function getResults() {
2 if (score >= 400) {
3 //Before: header.innerHTML = ’Perfect!’;
4 header.textContent = ’Perfect!’;
5 }
6 }
Code listing 3.10: Example of updated version using textContent.
The use of textContent also bypasses security risks. Attackers might use inner-
HTML property to run cross-site scripts. Although, HTML5 would not allow script
tags to execute; there are many ways to get away with it. For this reason, it is not
recommended to use it to insert plain text [23].
Overall, these changes made a significant impact on the response to user input.
Other modifications such as optimizing all other images for web, reducing the
number of CSS rules or JS functions helped to improve the page loading.
24
................................ 3.3. Testing and Feedback
Figure 3.17: Google Audit after improvements.
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Chapter 4
Use Cases
The mission of this project is to educate people around the world about phishing
and how to identify it. This application will be used mainly on international events
related to Cybersecurity or AI, but also on other channels such as social media and
blogs. This chapter will go through some real use cases and analyze the data obtained
during its use.
4.1 London Science Museum
On July 2019, the London Science Museum opened a new exhibition called Top
Secret where Avast is one of the main sponsors [24]. Moreover, the museum has
themed events the last Wednesday of every month known as Lates [25]. Avast
hosted the Lates event of September, and this represented a unique opportunity to
test the game with real users before releasing to the public.
The results on the 25th of September show that 50% of the participant got a
Perfect score. Nevertheless, the other 50% could not spot all the sites correctly,
42% Ok and 8% Disaster respectively. This test was helpful to make improvements
previously described on section 3.3.2.
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Figure 4.1: Lates game results in GA.
4.2 Woman in Business Expo
The Woman in Business Expo [26] is an event that took place in London and gathers
together different tech companies to demonstrate the importance of women in the
industry. This event was the first time we used the application, after testing and
deployment, with attendees that visited the Avast booth. Since we previously set up
GTM tags to send data to GA, it was possible to see results from participants of the
game.
Figure 4.2: Woman in Business Expo game results in GA.
On the results, it is visible that a majority of the participants got a Perfect score
(i.e. 70% of all game events). Even though this looks promising, there is still a 30%
that could be potentially a victim of a phishing attack. Another interesting fact is
that approximately 20% of all participants clicked on the Tips button, where they
can see some good practices to spot these type of sites.
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Figure 4.3: Woman in Business Expo events registered in GA for Tips button.
During the event, we shared the game on Twitter reaching other countries like the
United States (47 clicks), Finland (10 clicks) and Germany (3 clicks).
Figure 4.4: Twitter post on Avast account.
4.3 Others
After a month of releasing the website to the public and having a reasonable amount
of registered game events from other countries, it was also interesting to analyze
the results from an international point of view. Considering all users that played the
game, the top countries are the Czech Republic with 56%, the United States with
21% and the United Kingdom with 9% of the total user volume. Other countries
such as Mexico, Canada or Australia appear on the list.
Regarding game events, the results show that 51% of all users had a Perfect score,
while 28% and 21% received an Ok and Disaster score, respectively.
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Figure 4.5: Map of user activity in GA.
Figure 4.6: Worldwide game results in GA, October 2019.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we introduced the problem of phishing which is one of the most popular
and effective types of cyber-attacks due to its impact and scale that affect millions
of users every day. The consequences of successful phishing attacks include loss of
sensitive data or even the bankruptcy of businesses. Therefore, the importance to
emphasize this matter and educate people about how to recognize and protect from
phishing sites.
A gamified web application has been implemented to solve this problem. This
application allowed to showcase different types of websites and let users identify
whether they are phishing or not. That way, we could make the topic more entertain-
ing and demonstrate some of the most common practices that criminals use.
Data obtained during the use of this application indicated that approximately 30-
40 % of people globally were not able to identify the phishing sites presented. Even
though these results are not definitive, it correlates with the information researched
in the analysis and proves the relevance of the project for the future.
Ideally, the outcome of this thesis will help people to be more engaged and
informed about phishing and how to prevent it. Similarly, to keep a positive brand
impression of Avast on forthcoming events and fulfil their mission to provide safety
around the world.
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Further work on this project includes combining the use of AI and computer vision
methods presented previously to the game logic. Likewise, to integrate a database
that could map the phishing sites stored by Avast directly to the game. Furthermore,
extend this project to other regions and languages with local real-time content.
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Chapter 6
Acronyms
. AI - Artificial Intelligence.. CDN - Content Delivery Network.. CSS - Cascade Style Sheet.. CTA - Call To Action.. DOM - Document Object Model.. GA - Google Analytics.. GTM - Google Tag Manager..HTML - Hypertext Markup Language..HTTPS - Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure.. SaaS - Software as a Service.. SSL - Secure Socket Layer.. TSV - Tab Separated Values.. UI - User Interface.. UX - User Experience.
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Chapter 7
Glossary
. Phishing: Fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames,
passwords and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity
in an electronic communication.. Social Engineering: In the context of information security, is the psychologi-
cal manipulation of people into performing actions or divulging confidential
information.. Smishing: SMS phishing is a form of criminal activity using social engineering.
It uses cell phone text messages to deliver the bait to induce people to divulge
their personal information.. Vishing: Voice phishing is a form of criminal phone fraud, using social en-
gineering over the telephone system to gain access to private personal and
financial information for the purpose of financial reward.. Spyware: Software that aims to gather information about a person or organiza-
tion, sometimes without their knowledge, and send such information to another
entity without the consumer’s consent..Malware: Any software intentionally designed to cause damage to a computer,
server, client, or computer network.. Ransomware: A type of malware from cryptovirology that threatens to publish
the victim’s data or perpetually block access to it unless a ransom is paid.
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Appendix A
Contents of enclosed SD Card
readme.txt..................... the file with SD Card content description
phishing-game-master....the directory of implementation source code
thesis.......................................... the thesis text directory
BT_Eder_Tejada_2019.pdf...........the thesis text in PDF format
src.....................the directory of LATEX source codes of the thesis
prototypes..................................the directory of prototypes
wireframes..............................the directory of wireframes
interface...........................the directory of interface design
reports......................................... the directory of reports
analytics.............the directory of GA reports used in PDF format
audit...... the directory of Lighthouse audit reports used in PDF format
Implementation source code also available from:
https://github.com/etejada04/Phishing-Game-Final
https://git.int.avast.com/tejadaortigoza/phishing-game
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